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THE PUBLIC UTILITY STATUS OF A SHOPPING CENTER
TOTAL ENERGY SYSTEM
Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 440 F.2d 36 (70th Cir. 1971)
Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. (Cottonwood) is the
owner and operator of a large shopping center near Salt Lake City,
Utah. In 1968, Cottonwood sought to establish a total energy plan1
whereby it would generate and distribute electrical power to its ten-
ants, who were all retail business outlets. All facilities and equipment
were installed on contiguous private property owned by Cottonwood,
and electricity was to be supplied only to Cottonwood and its ten-
ants. Payment for services was included in the terms of the tenants'
lease contracts.
For seven years prior to the establishment of Cottonwood's energy
system, the center had received power from the Utah Power & Light
Company (Utah Power), a public utility regulated under Utah law.
When Cottonwood put its system into operation, a conflict arose between
Cottonwood and Utah Power. Each claimed the sole right to provide
electricity for J. C. Penney, a Cottonwood tenant. Cottonwood initiated
an antitrust suit in Federal District Court alleging that Utah Power had
attempted to monopolize the market for electrical power at the center,
thereby, interfering with the performance of Cottonwood's leases. In
response, Utah Power asserted that Cottonwood had no standing to
challenge Utah Power's economic activities because it did not possess
a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the Utah Pub-
lic Service Commission.' In a first construction of the amended Utah
statutes governing public utilities, summary judgment was entered for
Utah Power. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 3 and held: Cot-
1. See notes 5 & 6 infra.
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-4-25(1) (Supp. 1971) provides that:
No . . . electric corporation . .. shall henceforth establish, or begin con-
struction or operation of a plant or system, without having first obtained from
the commission a certificate that present or future public convenience and
necessity does or will require such construction. ...
3. Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d
36 (10th Cir. 1971).
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tonwood was functioning as a public utility within the meaning of
Utah law. Lacking the necessary certification, it had no right to sell
electricity. Thus, Cottonwood lacked standing to bring an antitrust
suit against Utah Power.4
Energy plans such as Cottonwood's are finding increased use, not
only in shopping centers, but also in large apartment complexes." They
are attractive to developers and operators for several reasons including
reduced construction costs and profitable distribution of services to
tenants. 6 Recently, the status of total energy systems with respect to
state utility law has become a question of some significance.7 The
future permissibility, management, and operation of such systems de-
pends in part upon whether or not they fall under state regulation
as public utilities.
In most states, the term "public utility" is construed to require
service or readiness to serve an indefinite public8 which has the right
4. Id. The circuit court also rejected Cottonwood's contention that Utah law
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as an unwarranted inva-
sion of private property. Citing a number of decisions including Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1877) and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 483 (1935), the court pointed
out that state legislatures have broad powers to regulate private commercial activities;
it is the nature, and not the ownership, of the business which makes it susceptible to
regulation; and where economic policies of the state legislature bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the public welfare, it is not for courts to judge their wisdom. The court
concluded:
There is little doubt that Utah has borne this burden here. At this date we
feel it unnecessary to explain why a restriction of competition in the utility
industry is a 'proper legislative purpose.' When we think of the overlapping
power systems, duplicative operations, and higher consumer prices that
would occur if every enterprise of this or of related nature were not subject
to state regulation, it is certain that for Utah the laws have a reasonable
relationship to the end. 440 F.2d at 43.
5. See ABA PUBLIC UTILITY LAw SEcION 124-25 (Annual Rep. 1965).
6. Cost savings arise from the type of equipment which can be utilized in
conjunction with total energy systems. For example in certain systems, air handling
units can be installed instead of air-conditioning and heating equipment. In such cases,
as much as $200,000 may be saved in the cost of each large store at the shopping
center. See PRACrICING LAW INsrrrum O1 NEw YoRK, BusINEss AND LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF SHOPPING CENERS (1968). For a discussion of the engineering and design as-
pects of total energy systems, see R.M.E. DIAMANT, TOTAL ENERGY (1970).
7. See note 5 supra.
8. See Claypool v. Lightning Delivery Co., 38 Ariz. 262, 299 P. 126 (1931);
Story v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 P. 1057 (1921); Sutton v. Hunziker, 75 Idaho
395, 272 P.2d 1012 (1954); Missouri v. Brown, 323 Mo. 818, 19 S.W.2d 1048 (1929);
Re Nafe, 4 P.U.R.3d 369 (Ohio P.U.C. 1953); Limestone Rural Tel. Co. v. Best,
56 Okla. 85, 155 P. 901 (1916); Schumacher v. Railroad Comm'n, 185 Wis. 303,
201 N.W. 241 (1924).
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to demand service. A minority of states, however, have rejected
these requirements and have found activities, such as the supply of
natural gas or electricity to industrial users, though not involving service
to the public, so impregnated with the public interest as to warrant
regulation as public utilities.1" On several occasions, this reasoning has
been applied to isolated energy systems like Cottonwood's. 11
9. The obligation of public utilities to serve members of the general public on an
equal basis is posited on the theory that public utilities are natural monopolies spared
from competition by governmental regulation. See generally Priest, Some Bases of
Public Utility Regulation, 36 Miss. L.J. 18 (1965).
Courts have often used the right of members of the public to demand service as a
definitional element of public utility. See, e.g., Allen v. Railroad Comm'n, 179 Cal.
68, 175 P. 466 (1918); Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Ames, 359 InI. 132,
194 N.E. 260 (1935); Bricker v. Industrial Gas Co., 58 Ohio App. 101, 16 N.E.2d
218 (1937); Cawkes v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 133 N.W. 157 (1911).
The right of members of the general public to demand service, however, is not ab-
solute. Services of utilities are often intrinsically limited by the size and nature of
their undertaking and their geographic situation. Denial of service to particular in-
dividuals may be justified by previous misuse of services or nonpayment of bills. See
generally Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope
and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312, 314-22 (1962).
10. See Public Service Comm'n v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 224 Ind. 662,
71 N.E.2d 117, aff'd, 332 U.S. 507 (1947), in which the Indiana Supreme Court found
the gas company's sales to large industrial users so closely related to the public interest
as to merit regulation. A case often cited in support of this line is Industrial Gas
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 408, 410, 21 N.E.2d 166, 168, 29 P.U.R.
(n.s.) 89, 93 (1939), in which the court states:
Regardless of the right of the public to demand and receive service . . . a
corporation that serves such a substantial part of the public as to make its
rates, charges, and methods of operation a matter of public concern, welfare
and interest subjects itself to regulation by the duly constituted government
authority...
This case presents a peculiar situation. Industrial Gas Co. had operated for several
years as a public utility under state regulation and, by a mere amendment in the
purpose clause of its articles of incorporation, it sought to avoid regulation. It is
noteworthy that later Ohio decisions dealing with the definition of "public utility" re-
quire a showing of a "readiness to serve an indefinite public." Ohio Power Co. v.
Village of Attica, 19 Ohio App. 2d 89, 97-8, 250 N.E.2d 111, 117 (1969).
11. The ABA Utilities Section Newsletter (April 1, 1966) reports that the Nevada
State Commission found a total energy system similar to Cottonwood's operated by the
Boulevard Shopping Center, a public utility under Nevada law, despite the fact that only
a limited number of tenants were to be served. Contra, Application of Philadelphia
Suburban Water Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 41 Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 505 (1964);
Drexelbrook Assoc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 418 Pa. 430, 212 A.2d 237
(1966). The Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission found that the operator of a
garden type apartment who acquired equipment for the distribution and sale of elec-
tricity, gas and water to its tenants was functioning as a public utility. On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the undertaking was not a public
utility because the apartment operators did not offer service to the public, but rather
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In Cottonwood, the circuit court concluded that Utah had elected to
follow the minority view. Consequently, a readiness to serve the
general public is no longer an essential element in the definition of pub-
lic utility, and, despite the fact that the shopping center proposed to
serve only a very limited class, its total energy system was a public
utility. The court's holding is based on two considerations. First, the
court points to recent changes in the pertinent sections of the Utah
Code. The inclusion of cooperatives in the definition of "electrical
corporation' ' 2 has the effect of overruling Garkane Power Company
v. Public Service Commission.3 Garkane had held that cooperatives
were not public utilities because they did not offer service to the gen-
eral public. In the same provisions, the legislature expanded the
meaning of "for public service" to include "or for its consumers or mem-
bers for domestic, commercial or industrial use."' 4 This further indi-
cates the legislature's intention to replace the criterion of service to
the general public with a test encompassing additional types of con-
sumers.' 5  The language of the section defining "public utility" is
to a small selective class of persons. See also Welch, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PUBLIC UTILrTIEs REGULATION 71-73 (Rev. Ed. 1968).
12. This case is the first construction of the 1965 amendments to the Utah public
utility statutes. The critical provision is UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-1(20) (Supp. 1971)
in which "electrical corporation" is defined:
Every corporation, cooperative association and person, their lessees, trustees
and receivers or trustees appointed by any court and whatsoever, owning,
controlling, operating or managing any electric plant, or in anywise furnish-
ing electric power, for public service or to its consumers or members for
domestic, commercial or industrial use, within this state except where electric-
ity is generated on or distributed by the producer through private property
alone, i.e., property not dedicated to public use, solely for his own use or the
use of his tenants, ...
The compiler's note reveals that the section underwent significant amendment in 1965
which so far is relevant:
. . . inserted "cooperative association" after "corporation," "or to its consumers
or members for domestic, commercial or industrial use" after "public service,"
"i.e., property not dedicated to public use" after "property alone .. "
The amended language is italicized.
13. 98 Utah 466, 100 P.2d 571 (1940). The court distinguishes Garkane from
Cottonwood in that the former did not deal with the exception stated in UTAH CODE
ANN. § 54-2-1(20) (Supp. 1971), but with the subsequently changed language "fur-
nishing electrical power for public use" in the 1917 version of the same section. How-
ever, the court concludes that the 1965 statute overrules Garkane insofar as that case
defined "for public use." Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 440 F.2d 36. 41 (1971).
14. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-1(20) (Supp. 1971).
15. Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d
36, 41 (10th Cir. 1971).
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equally broad and supports this construction."'
Secondly, the public nature of the shopping center precludes Cot-
tonwood's total energy plan from falling within the statutory excep-
tion exempting electricity "generated on or distributed by the pro-
ducer through private property alone, i.e., property not dedicated to
the public use, solely for his own use or the use of his tenants. . . .
The court indicates that the modem shopping center is by nature a pub-
lic place. Not only are the wares of the various merchants held
out to the public eye, but, through the auspices of the merchant
association, the center sponsors a myriad of festivals and shows 8 tail-
ored to attract an increasing number of the public as potential patrons.
In this context, the "beneficial use"'19 of energy expended in such op-
erations as air-conditioning the enclosed mall goes far beyond the ten-
ants.
Cottonwood must procure certification from the Utah Public Serv-
ice Commission if it wishes to continue operation of its total energy
system. '  Certification is dependent upon the Commission's determina-
16. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-1(30) (Supp. 1971) provides that:
The term 'public utility' includes every. . . gas corporation, electrical cor-
poration . . . where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered
to, the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation or electrical
corporation where the gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any member or
consumers within the State of Utah for domestic, commercial or industrial
use. And whenever any. . . gas corporation, electrical corporation. . . per-
forms a service for or delivers a commodity to the public, or in the case of a
gas corporation or electrical corporation selling or furnishing gas or elec-
tricity to any member or consumers within the state of Utah, for domestic,
commercial or industrial use, for which any compensation or payment what-
soever is received, such . . . gas corporation, electrical corporation . . . is
hereby declared to be a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation
of the commission and to the provisions of this title. (Emphasis supplied).
17. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-1(20) (Supp. 1971).
18. Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d
36, 39 n.8 (10th Cir. 1971). The court lists the promotional activities engaged in by
Cottonwood:
a small one ring traveling circus with one truckload of animals; a Gym-
kahana, consisting of small car races; sidewalk sales, moonlight sales, foreign
car shows; Junior Achievement Programs; Garden Shows; outdoor living
boat shows; Go-cart Shows; Stamp Shows; Aztec Indian Dances; European
Art Display; the Singing Christmas Tree; Halloween Parades; Snowmobile
Shows; Ceramics Shows; Gladiola Shows; Handicraft Shows; Sports Car
Shows; Home Entertainment Shows; Dolphin Shows; Outdoor living camper
shows and Mobilehome Shows.
19. Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d
37, 40 (10th Cir. 1971).
20. UTAH CoDa ANN. § 54-4-25(1) (Utah P.S.C. 1970).
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tion that Cottonwood's energy system is technically and economically
feasible and consistent with the public convenience and necessity.21
Because Cottonwood's system overlaps with service provided by Utah
Power, the shopping center has the added burden of proving that
Utah Power's service is inadequate and that its deficiencies cannot be
corrected by means within the normal course of business. 22 Should
Cottonwood receive certification, the operation of its total energy plan
would be subjected to state regulations governing rates,23 service,24
and accounting.25
Cottonwood, by eliminating the requirement of service to the gen-
eral public, has expanded the scope of utilites regulation in Utah.
Though Utah's is the minority position, private utilities such as
Cottonwood's are the proper subject of cognizance by state regulatory
agencies. They stand in competition with other utilities and can re-
sult in duplication of service systems. Furthermore, the unrestricted
development of private energy systems may adversely affect power com-
panies serving the public. Generally, large consumers such as Cotton-
wood are more efficiently served and offer higher profit margins than
smaller consumers. The denial of the more profitable large consum-
ers to power companies tends to weaken their economic base. This
may be undesirable from the perspective of the public convenience
and necessity. State commissions should be empowered to gauge the
effect of private energy systems upon the entire utility industry and de-
termine the situations in which such systems are consonant with the
public interest.
21. Re Utah Mobile Tel. Co., 85 P.U.R.3d 252 (1970).
22. Id.
23. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-4 (Supp. 1971).
24. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-18 (Supp. 1971).
25. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-23 (Supp. 1971).
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